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 The Imitation Game: Becoming imitators of Christ 
 
Introduction 
The idea that imitating Christ is somehow essential for the Christian spiritual life has played 
an important role in the history of Christian theology.1 Søren Kierkegaard, for instance, 
claimed that ‘[o]nly the imitator is the true Christian’ (1848/1991, 256) and Thomas à 
Kempis’s The Imitation of Christ is reportedly the most read devotional work after the Bible. 
2 ‘The disciple of Christ’, we are told by an anonymous Eleventh Century theologian, ‘can do 
nothing better than walk as Christ walked…If Christ at various times performed all these 
things, the disciple of Christ should also do the same’ (Constable (1995), 180). Imitating 
Christ, it has been argued, gives us a framework for Christian moral thinking and behaviour.3 
The principle behind this framework is straightforward—Christ is a morally perfect person, 
and if we act more like him, we will improve, morally speaking. Or, according to the popular 
Christian wristband, we simply need to ask: ‘What would Jesus do?’ every time we consider 
acting in a certain way, and our behaviour will become more like his.  
 As well as this important moral dimension to imitating Christ, there is also a 
theological significance to imitation. And although, as Giles Constable tells us, ‘scholars 
have long debated over the exact meaning of “to follow” and “to imitate” in the Bible’ (1995, 
145), there have been some common themes which have emerged throughout the history of 
Christian theology. More specifically, and something which I go on to discuss in more detail 
shortly, it has often been argued that the imitation of Christ has an important role to play in 
the ordo saltutis, in particular, in our sanctification and eventual deification, when, we are 
told, that ‘we will be like him, for we will see him as he is’ (1 John 3:2; all quotations from 
the Bible taken from the NRSV).  
However, despite there being a vast literature on the theology of imitating Christ, as 
well as some practical advice about how do to this, what is lacking from this literature, and 
what I aim to provide in this article, is an account of just what the imitation of Christ consists 
of and what precisely the conditions are for imitating Christ.  
I begin by situating the discussion of imitating Christ in wider Christian theology, and 
argue that imitating Christ is an important way of engaging in the restoration of the imago 
dei. Using Eleonore Stump’s (2010) analysis of the ordo saltutis, I discuss the importance of 
sanctification and imitation for the process of becoming more like Christ. This process 
begins, according to Stump, with the agent’s justification, in which she receives the second-
order desire for union with God. The process of sanctification is the integration and re-
ordering of the agent’s desires in accord with her second-order desire for union with God. 
Through the process of sanctification, not only does the agent’s behaviour change to become 
more Christ, but also she undergoes a metaphysical change too—when the process of 
sanctification is complete (after her death), she will be made like Christ through the process 
of deification. This process is a radically transformative process which re-orientates and 
                                                          
1 See Constable, Three Studies in Medieval Religious and Social Thought, 143-218, for a 
detailed history of the imitation of Christ. 
2 According to the New Advent Catholic Encyclopaedia, the Imitation of Christ is the most 
read devotional work after the Bible. See, ‘Imitation of Christ’ in New Advent Catholic 
Encyclopaedia, (New York: Robert Appleton Company) Retrieved July 1, 2015 from: 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/07674c.htm  
3 See, for example, Bernard of Clairvaux, Sancti Bernardi opera, and Johannes Tauler, The 
Following of Christ.  
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replaces the desires and preferences of the believer to bring about union with God. It is the 
completion of this process, or so I argue, which the imitation of Christ must aim at.  
However, this discussion of the theology of imitation generates a problem which I aim 
to resolve: namely, if imitating Christ is a radically transformative process, it is not obvious 
how to practically engage with this process. That is, the simple replication of Christ’s 
behaviour, the act of just doing what Jesus would do, might result in a mimicry of Christ’s 
actions, but it would not allow for the kind of radical metaphysical change of becoming more 
like Christ. To see this problem more clearly, and to give an account just what imitating 
Christ consists in, we must adopt a more detailed definition of imitation. To do this, I draw on 
the extensive work in philosophy of cognitive psychology which seeks to explain the role of 
imitation in infant development. As I go on to explain, in the psychological literature on 
imitation there is a distinction made between different kinds of behaviour replication: (i) 
emulation—a kind of intention replication often seen in non-human primates, (ii) mimicry—
the reproduction of a certain action without attention to an agent’s intentions, and (iii) 
imitation—the replication of an agent’s behaviour with a particular focus on their intentions. 
It is this third class of behaviour replication which is used in the psychological literature to 
explain the social, cognitive and even moral development in infants. Furthermore, it is this 
third kind of behaviour replication which can best help us understand what it is to imitate 
Christ in a radically transformative manner, or so I argue. Yet, often when we think about the 
imitation of Christ, the kind of behaviour replication discussed is of the first two kinds. The 
problem with this, as we will see, is that replicating someone’s actions is insufficient for the 
radical change to one’s self which is required for the process of sanctification.  
Despite the clarity which this discussion of imitation brings, another problem arises in 
that imitation, as it is understood in psychology, requires an experience in which the 
individual somehow perceives the intentions of the person she is imitating. However, it is not 
obvious that we have this kind of access to Christ, and so it is not clear that this level of 
contact is possible for our imitation of him. This leaves us with a dilemma—either we 
downplay the theological significance of imitating Christ as a transformative process, or we 
adopt an impossible standard for imitating Christ which is only available for the First Century 
disciples, and Paul the Apostle (i.e. those who come into direct contact with Christ).  
A solution to this dilemma can be found, I argue, by noting that the Christian tradition 
emphasises that Christ is not merely a historical figure, but rather, a living person who we can 
somehow experience the presence of today, as Christ tells his disciples in the Gospel 
According to Matthew: ‘I am with you always, to the end of the age’ (Matthew 28:20). This 
discussion of presence and imitation also benefits, I argue, from considering the doctrine that 
not only is Christ present to and with his followers, but also, the Holy Spirit is present in his 
followers (Romans 8:11). According to the New Testament writers, the Holy Spirit helps us 
to become more Christ in some way. Following Adam Green (2009), and Eleonore Stump 
(2013), I claim that another discussion in cognitive psychology can help us here—both the 
presence of Christ and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, according to Green and Stump, can 
be understood as instances of what psychologists call ‘joint-attention’. That is, experiences of 
God’s presence can be understood as experiences in which God and the believer are aware of 
each other and are both aware of each other’s awareness of one another. This kind of 
attention sharing is essential for imitation, as it is discussed in cognitive and developmental 
psychology. And so, if this is the best way of understanding experiences of Christ and the 
indwelling of the Holy Spirit, then imitating Christ is still possible. The result of this is that 
cultivating the presence of Christ and sharing attention with him becomes crucially important 
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for the task of imitating Christ. This position then gives an important role for spiritual 
practises which allow us to share attention with Christ in the Christian spiritual life.  
 
A theology of imitation: restoring the imago dei 
Before giving a more specific account of what imitation consists of, it will first be important 
to situate our understanding of imitating Christ in wider Christian theology. In seeing the 
development of imitation in Christian theology, we will have a better grasp of what an 
account of imitation needs to explain.4  
Although the language of imitation, (μιμητής) is only found in the New Testament 
letters, the human imitation of the divine can be traced through the whole of Christian 
Scripture. In the creation narrative in Genesis, human beings are described as distinct from 
the rest of creation in that they are made in the image of God (Genesis 1:27). This affords 
humanity a dominion over creation and an intimate union God and the imago dei is crucial to 
understanding this relationship. The distortion of the image of God is seen starkly in the fall 
of humanity (Genesis 3) in the loss of union with God. And so, the starting point of Christian 
Scripture is that humanity is made to reflect God but this image is distorted by sin. The image 
of God is never fully restored in human beings until the process of deification is complete 
(more on this later), through the salvific power of Christ. The process of becoming more like 
Christ in this life, although never complete, is what theologians describe as the process of 
sanctification.5  
We see very early in the Torah that the command to imitate God is an essential part of 
the Jewish law; God commands the Israelites in Leviticus to be ‘holy because I am holy’ 
(Leviticus 11:44-45) 6. This command to ‘be holy because I am holy’ is a command to engage 
in the restoration of the imago dei in human beings by acting in God’s likeness. However, 
this is not made possible through direct contact with God; instead the commands of God are 
mediated and passed down through specific individuals chosen to decree God’s laws and 
words to his people. So whilst Moses is described as communing ‘face to face with God as 
one speaks to a friend’ (Exodus 33:11), the Israelites could not even look upon the face of 
Moses after being in the presence of God, and the human contact with the divine was 
                                                          
4 There will not be room to give a detailed overview of imitation in Scripture, in particular, 
one discussion I overlook entirely is the distinction between ‘following’ and ‘imitating’. 
Christ asks for followers (Matthew 4:19) and not imitators, and it is only in Paul’s writing 
that the language of ‘μιμητής’ (mimētēs) is used in his encouragement to imitate God, Christ 
and himself. See, 1 Corinthians 4:16, 1 Corinthians 11:1, Ephesians 5:1, 1 Thessalonians 1:6 
and 1 Thessalonians 2:14. The reason I do not discuss this, is because often in the theological 
literature, and even in Biblical translation, following and imitating are used synonymously. 
For more on this difference, see Constable (1992, 145-6). 
5 In the history of theology there has sometimes been a distinction made between ‘image’ and 
‘likeness’. Rupert of Deutz (1966, 188) for instance, claimed that after the fall, human beings 
retained the likeness of God, in virtue of her reason and freedom of will but lost the image of 
God in her lack of virtue (see, Constable (1995), 167). Rupert maintained that God 
preordained that humanity would both fall and be restored into his likeness (Constable 
(1995), 167). In more recent theology this distinction between image and likeness has been 
blurred, but the idea that imitating Christ is restorative in bringing us closer into the image or 
likeness of God has remained. I do not follow Rupert’s distinction here, but do think that it is 
important to distinguish between image and likeness. 
6 We see a similar command in Leviticus 19:2, Leviticus 22:28 and Jeremiah 31:33. 
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mediated to such an extent that they could only see God’s glory reflected in the veiled face of 
Moses (Exodus 34:34-5). This model of imitation is seen throughout the Old Testament—
humanity is always in mediated contact with God, and relates to the divine ‘under the veil’ of 
whoever the prophet, king or leader of the time is.  
The imitation of Christ stands in stark contrast to the indirect, mediated account of 
imitation we see in the Old Testament. The imitation of Christ makes possible the full 
restoration of the imago dei and overcomes the superficial, mediated imitation which is 
possible through Moses. This contrast between the imitation made possible through Moses 
and the imitation possible through Christ is seen most clearly in a passage from 2 Corinthians 
in which St Paul writes that 
 
[s]ince we have such a hope, we are very bold, not like Moses, who put a veil over his 
face so that the Israelites might not see the end of the fading splendour. But their 
minds were hardened; for to this day, when they read the old covenant, that same veil 
remains unlifted, because only through Christ is it taken away. Yes, to this day 
whenever Moses is read a veil lies over their minds; but when a man turns to the Lord 
the veil is removed. Now the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, 
there is freedom. And we all, with unveiled face, beholding the glory of the Lord, are 
being changed into his likeness from one degree of glory to another; for this comes 
from the Lord who is the Spirit. (2 Corinthians 3:12-18) 
 
Here, Paul discusses the New Covenant between God and humanity in which the imago dei is 
restored through our relationship with Christ. Paul directly contrasts the mediated relationship 
made possible under the Old Covenant with the New Covenant in which Christ takes the veil 
away between humanity and God. Whereas the Israelites could access the divine presence 
indirectly through the veiled face of Moses, the Christian is able to approach God ‘face to 
face’ through Christ. The imitation of Christ then becomes an integral part of how we are 
redeemed from sin, begin the process of sanctification, and enter into union with God. The 
believer now has a direct access to God through Christ made possible by the presence of the 
Spirit.  
Let us spell these themes out more explicitly. The presence of human sin means that 
human beings, although created to be in union with God and to reflect his likeness, cannot be 
in such a relationship. As Stump (2003) discusses, this can be understood in terms of two 
distinct problems. First, the problem of past sin: how can a just God enter into union with 
humans who have committed bad acts? And secondly, the problem of future sin: how can a 
holy God enter into union with humans who are the kind of thing that do commit bad acts 
((2003, 430)? According to Stump, our understanding of the ordo salutis (justification, 
sanctification, and deification) addresses both of these problems in different ways, and helps 
us to see the importance of imitation for the redemption of human beings, which should be 
understood, for the purposes of this discussion, in terms of the restoration of the imago dei. 
As Stump puts it, the result of human sin is that human beings lack the resources to 
come into union with God, since their desires are not aimed at union with God. The process 
of transformation, which seeks to redeem human beings, begins with justification, which 
crucially, according to Stump, begins with ‘a free act of will in which a person hates his own 
moral wrong and longs for the goodness that is God’s’ (2010, 163). In order for this to occur 
Stump thinks, the agent must receive the second-order desire for union with God as a gift of 
grace from God (2010, 163).  
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The second stage in this process of transformation is sanctification. Sanctification of 
human beings requires an engagement in the process of becoming more Christ like through 
the re-orientation and integration of our desires in accord with the second-order desire for 
union with God. As Stump writes, sanctification is the ‘process in which God cooperates with 
a human person’s higher-order desires’ a process which will ‘eventually culminate in a state 
of complete moral goodness’ (2010, 160). Sanctification is the process of God helping an 
agent to integrate her second-order desire for union with God with her first order-desires. As 
Stump notes, however, ‘the process of sanctification is not finished during a person’s 
lifetime. If it is brought into completion at all, that completion occurs only in the afterlife’ 
(2010, 161). Importantly for our discussion of imitating Christ, the process of sanctification is 
one in which the believer both behaves, and becomes more like Christ.  
Although Stump does not describe it as such, this completion of sanctification occurs 
at the beatific vision which initiates the third stage of this transformation: the process of 
‘deification’ (or ‘glorification’).7 Through deification, human beings enter into full union 
with God which is made possible only after death in which, ‘we shall be like him’ (1 John 
3:2). Deification is the completion of the restoration of imago dei.  
We can now see how important the imitation of Christ is theologically. God’s purpose 
is to bring humanity into union with him and to restore the imago dei. Union with God is only 
possible after death, when the agent shall ‘be like him’ (1 John 3:2) through the completion 
of her deification. If the believer’s ultimate aim is to be fully like Christ and to be restored 
into the image of God, then the aim of the present spiritual life, is to engage in sanctification; 
the act of becoming like Christ. Sanctification, then, is the process of imitating Christ. And, 
as we have seen from the passages above, this has a distinctly moral element (the believer 
behaves more like Christ) and a metaphysical element (the believer will be more like Christ).  
With the theological importance of imitation explained, I now go on to consider just 
what imitating Christ consists of.  
  
Imitating Christ: a problem 
So what might an account of imitating Christ consist of? And what conditions can be given 
for such an account?  
In imitating a person, we might think, an agent attempts to replicate or copy some 
feature of another person’s actions or behaviour. There are existing examples of this kind of 
imitation in the Christian tradition; when Paul instructs believers to ‘[b]e imitators of me, as I 
am of Christ.’ (1 Corinthians 11:1), or in the popular Catholic devotional book, The Imitation 
of Mary, in which we are told, ‘Happy the man who imitates our Lady, for in imitating her he 
imitates Jesus’ (De Rouville (1980), 15), these are instances which an agent imitates 
important religious figures by attempting act in a way which is in keeping with what she 
knows about Mary, or Paul. This kind of imitation is not constrained to Scripture, either. For 
instance, one might be so humbled by reading the biography of Dietrich Bonhoeffer that she 
seeks to imitate Bonhoeffer in some way—by acting like him, speaking like him, and maybe 
even thinking like him. If imitation simply consists in an attempt to replicate some kind of 
behaviour of another person, then imitating Christ simply consists of attempting to perform 
the actions which Christ is reported to have performed. And this is precisely what the 
                                                          
7 See David Efird and David Worsley’s (2015) critical review of Stump’s Wandering in 
Darkness for a more detailed discussion of this point.  
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‘WWJD?’ movement tells us; by thinking about how Christ might respond to the situations 
we face, we have a helpful framework for Christian ethics as an imitation of Christ. 8  
The problem with this approach, however, is that imitating Christ is not equivalent to 
imitating Bonhoeffer or even Paul. Copying certain examples of behaviour from historical 
individuals might change our own thinking and behaviour in certain ways. However, if 
imitating Christ is essential for the redemption of human agents through the process of 
sanctification, and eventually, deification, then it will be important that our account of 
imitation captures the transformative nature of this process. It is not obvious that mere 
behaviour replication can do this. In becoming more Christ like, the aim is not a small scale 
change of the believer’s behaviour and preferences, but, rather, a metaphysical change in 
which she both acts like and becomes like Christ.9 The sum total of what know about Christ, 
however, can be fitted into four very condensed biographical accounts. We know far more 
about Bertrand Russell, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and even Plato than we know about Christ. If the 
aim of the Christian spiritual life is to be more like Christ in every way, however, it is not 
obvious how Christ would respond in every scenario. It might be obvious that Christ would 
give to the poor if asked to but would Christ always tidy his room if his mother asked him to? 
Would Christ buy battery farmed eggs? It is not clear how asking ‘WWJD?’ can help us here. 
Whilst it may be of some help in allowing us to act more like Christ in some ways, it will be 
severely limited in helping us to be more like Christ in the deep, transformative manner 
which is required for our sanctification and deification.  
 For an account which captures what it means to imitate Christ, then, it will not be 
sufficient that the believer can do a good impression of Christ; imitation cannot be restricted 
to a small set of actions which the Christian believer is required to replicate. Rather, imitating 
Christ is a lifelong task which aims at the cognitive, moral and personal transformation of 
one’s whole self. It is important not only that the believer’s behaviour is Christ like, then, but 
also her desires, preferences and will must be transformed to be more like Christ’s.10 
 It is possible to give a more plausible account of imitating Christ, I think, which gives 
a more detailed and focused account of what imitation is and what it aims at doing. In doing 
this, we can give a less problematic account of what imitating Christian is and how it is 
possible. In order to do this, it will be important to take note of certain features of the 
extensive psychological literature on imitation.  
 
Imitation and behaviour replication  
Before I go on to give an account of imitating Christ, it is important to first adopt a clearer 
definition of imitation, in order to see how well it fits the theology of imitating Christ. 
Thankfully, such a definition has already been proposed, revised and refined many times over 
                                                          
8 A helpful discussion of the theology behind the ‘WWJD’ wristbands is given by A.K.M. 
Adam in ‘Walk This Way. Repetition, Difference and the Imitation of Christ’  
9 Through the process of imitation, the Christian believer goes through what L.A. Paul 
describes as a ‘transformative experience’ ((2014), 1). That is, the imitation of Christ is an 
experience which is cognitively and personally transformative to such an extent that the agent 
cannot project forward to what it will be like to be fully like Christ. 
10 As well as the problem of how copying Christ’s actions allows for transformation, there is 
also a practical problem with imitating Christ—that is, it is not obvious how to begin copying 
or replicating someone who is morally perfect. We need an account of imitation not only to 
be theologically coherent, but also to give us some practical guidance on how to engage in 
the process. Telling someone to do what Jesus would do is of little or no help, here.  
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in the psychological literature on imitation and infant development. Although the aims of 
discussing imitation in Christian theology are vastly different from the aims of the discussion 
of imitation in cognitive psychology, the extensive psychological literature in this area can 
provide some important insights for the theology of imitation, or so I argue. Of particular 
importance for psychology, and something which can help focus our theology of imitation, is 
the distinction between behaviour replication and the replication of goal-oriented intentional 
actions. In order to imitate another person, or so Ellen Fridland and Richard Moore (2014) 
tell us, the replication of certain behaviour is not sufficient, but rather, it is also necessary that 
the imitator recognizes, and aims at reproducing, the particular goal-directed intentions of the 
person being imitated ((2014), 874). As I go on to argue, this difference is crucial for 
understanding what it means to be imitator of Christ. That is, merely replicating the reported 
behaviour of Christ will not allow for true imitation of Christ.  
As Susan Hurley and Nick Chater note, ‘imitation is a rare ability that is 
fundamentally linked to characteristically human forms of intelligence, in particular, to 
language, culture, and the ability to understand other minds’ ((2005), 1). The ability to imitate 
or replicate certain behaviour occurs very early in human beings, it has been demonstrated 
that ‘[n]ewborn infants less than an hour old can…imitate facial gestures.’ (Gallagher, 
((2005), 70-2). This early skill of imitating another person has an important role to play in the 
development of language, social skills and even moral behaviour.11 Imitation occurs both at 
an intentional, goal orientated level in which the infant aims at copying certain behavioural 
traits, and also on a subconscious level.  
So what does it mean to imitate another person? Straightforwardly, imitation is the 
copying of certain kinds of observed behaviour in other agents. However, whilst all imitation 
is a kind of behaviour replication, not all behaviour replication is imitative. Fridland and 
Moore, in their recent reworking of Michael Tomasello’s (1996, 1999a, 1999b, & Boesch, 
1998, & Carpenter, 2005) work on imitation, distinguish between three kinds of behaviour 
replication: emulation, mimicry and imitation ((2014), 858). As Boesch and Tomasello 
describes it, emulation learning is ‘the process whereby an individual observes and learns 
some dynamic affordances of the inanimate world as a result of the behaviour of other 
animals and then uses what it has learned to devise its own behavioural strategies’ ((1998), 
598). Thus, to take an example, in observing someone using the self-scan till at supermarket, 
Jill may emulate the behaviour of the individual in front of her since she sees that by 
scanning the barcode on the item, and then inserting cash into the relevant slots, she may 
purchase her shopping. She does not aim at reproducing the particular technique of scanning; 
she is concerned with the manipulation of the self-scan till in order to complete her 
transaction. As Fridland and Moore emphasise, emulation learning is concerned with ‘the 
outcomes of others’ activity, but not on the precise actions that they perform’ ((2014), 858); 
the emulative learner takes the behaviour of others to best understand the object being 
manipulated, and to then use this understanding in achieving one’s own goals.12 Crucially, 
emulation is not concerned with the intentions of the person being observed, but only on 
certain outcomes.  
Another important kind of behaviour replication which is discussed in the literature, is 
the mimicry of behaviour. As Want & Harris define it, ‘mimicry is…the replication of a 
                                                          
11 On the role of imitation in moral development, see Jesse J. Prinz, ‘Imitation and Moral 
Development’ in Hurley & Charter, Vol 1., pp. 267-300. 
12 It is this process of emulation, according to Tomasello, which is the primary process by 
which non-human primates learn socially (1996). 
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model’s actions in the absence of any insight into why those actions are effective, or even 
what goal they serve’ ((2002), 3). A parrot, for instance, mimics human speech without 
aiming at reproducing any intentions or goals of the communicator (Fridland and Moore 
(2014), 859). It is possible, in mimicking someone, to be entirely ignorant of the meaning or 
intention of the behaviour which is reproduced.  
According to Fridland and Moore, although in both mimicry and emulation agents 
focus on some kind of behaviour replication, neither should be understood as instances as 
imitation. The reason for this, is that the individual who imitates is concerned both with the 
intention behind the action, as well as the replication of action. To see how emulation and 
mimicry differ from imitation more clearly, consider an example from a parallel discussion in 
the philosophy of artificial intelligence. As well as providing a pithy title for an article 
discussing the imitation of Christ, Alan Turing’s (1950) ‘imitation game’, provides a helpful 
way of clarifying the difference between imitation and other kinds of behaviour replication. 
Turing’s ‘imitation game’ is a test which aims at demonstrating that machines can think—an 
interrogator communicates with both a human subject and a digital computer and then 
attempts to correctly identify which is which ((1950), 433-4). If the two subjects were 
indistinguishable, Turing thought, we would have some evidence for artificial intelligence. 
Turing’s game infers a level of sophisticated mental processing from a replication of human 
behaviour. However, as Donald Davidson argues, ‘Turing’s Test eliminates the possibility of 
telling whether a creature or machine thinks without determining what it thinks…the Test 
makes meaningful verbal responses the essential mark of thought’ ((2004), 80-1). Or, as John 
Searle (1980) discusses in his famous discussion of the Chinese Room, a successful 
computerised imitator can copy the syntax of human speech whilst lacking the semantics 
required for us to know what the computer means. In order for us to ask whether a machine 
can think, Davidson argues, we must be able to tell whether the computer means something 
by what it says ((2004), 82). Whilst Turing’s machine might be able to do a good job of 
deceiving an interrogator, determining the meaning behind certain syntax requires not just 
that we process a collection of data from a subject, but that we observe the connections 
between the speaker and the world ((2004), 83). In order for there to be meaningful 
interaction (and not merely mimicry), Davidson thinks, we need to interact with the subject in 
relation to the world and not just receive raw data.  
This objection brings out a useful distinction between imitation and other forms 
behaviour replication such as mimicry and emulation. The lesson we can learn from 
Davidson’s objection, is that not all behaviour replication is imitative. In fact, the behaviour 
replication of human behaviour by a machine is not a good test of intelligence, precisely 
because there is no real imitation in the imitation game—only mimicry. Or, at the very least, 
it shows us that it would be impossible to detect genuine imitation by using such a technique.  
So what, more precisely, distinguishes imitation from other forms of behaviour 
replication? Although there is a wide range of views on what exactly imitation is in the 
psychological literature, it seems to be uncontentious that for psychologists, imitation is more 
than just replication of behaviour. As Fridland and Moore go on go on to define it,  
 
Imitation is the reproduction of an observed behavior where the agent imitating (1) 
recognizes the behavior of the demonstrator as goal-directed and (2) has some 
particular interest in or concern for replicating the precise technique performed by 
the author of the observed action. (2014, 874; emphasis in the original)  
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The first condition helps us to see the importance of the agent’s intention in imitating her—
contrary to mimicry, when the agent imitates someone, she is concerned with the intention of 
the behaviour. For the parrot, it makes little difference why the person observed utters the 
words, ‘Top of the morning!’, nor is the machine which is programmed to ask ‘How are you 
today?’ concerned with emulating the intention of social interaction which the human who 
programmed it uses such an utterance for. To see that this is true, we only need note that for 
the computer or the parrot who mimic human behaviour, the replication of meaningless 
gibberish could be considered just as successful an act of mimicry as the above examples. 
Although there is disagreement concerning whether the agent must be aware of the intention 
behind the behaviour, or merely aware that the behaviour is intentional, at the very least, the 
minimal condition suggested above is necessary for imitation. Secondly, whereas emulation 
is ‘outcome-centric’, according to Fridland and Moore, imitation is ‘technique-centric’ 
((2014), 869). The emulator seeks to get at the same results or ends as the agent being 
observed, whereas in imitation 
 
observers should intend not just to reproduce the outcomes of others’ intentional 
actions, but, additionally, to match precisely the actions that they produce in pursuit of 
these goals—in a manner that indicates that this careful matching of the behavior is 
itself a goal of the imitating subject (and end-in-itself)’. (Fridland and Moore, ((2014), 
868)  
 
Fridland and Moore’s emphasis on the technique of the action, rather than the goal, is an 
important distinction which helps to distinguish the kind of behaviour replication which 
human infants perform from those of non-human primates, which are described and 
emulative and no imitative. As Tomasello writes, ‘human children are much more focused on 
the actual actions of the demonstrator, whereas chimpanzees are much more focused on the 
outcome of her actions’ ((2009), 217). To put it succinctly, then, imitation is a replication of 
certain observed behaviour in which the agent is concerned both with the intention, as well as 
the specifics of the observed behaviour.  
 We should note here that the definition of imitation given by Fridland and Moore 
intends to capture the minimum requirements for imitative behaviour replication, and that this 
minimum requirement will not be sufficient for imitation in some important cases. Most 
notably, for instance, it will not account for the kind of imitation which plays a role in infant 
cognitive development in its fullest sense. It is important for infant development not only that 
actions are experienced as goal-orientated, but that the goal-orientation of these actions is in 
some sense transparent to the infant. The transparency of intentions in cognitive development 
comes in stages, as Tomasello et al. (2005) note, although intention sharing is essential for 
cognitive development, prior to gaining the ability to do this, children are able the distinguish 
between animate and inanimate actions without being able to interpret the content of this in a 
complex way. So, Fridland and Moore’s minimal kind of imitation will occur at the early 
stages of infant development, but as a child’s cognitive capacities get more sophisticated, so 
too will the kind of imitation.  
 It is important then that we consider not only the minimal kind of imitation, but also 
the kind of imitation which occurs in childhood development. If imitation of Christ is as 
significant and transformative as described previously, then the minimal kind of imitation 
will not fit our theology of imitating Christ. I will return to this point shortly. Before doing 
so, it is important to note that the psychological literature on imitation has drawn extensively 
on recent findings in neuroscience which, as Hurley and Chater describe it, point towards a 
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‘direct link between perception and action’ ((2005), 3). Of particular importance for the work 
on imitation is the discussion of the ‘mirror-neuron system’—a set of neurons in the brain 
which appear to replicate or mirror observed actions in others, making possible a kind of 
mind-reading in which we perceive the intentions and emotional states of other persons.  
In the early 1990s, Italian neuroscientists discovered that in monkeys, and then as 
later discovered, in humans, a set of neurons (which have come to be known as the ‘mirror 
neuron system’) activated both during the execution of certain ‘purposeful, goal-related hand 
actions’ (Galese, 2003, 35) and when observing similar hand actions performed by another 
individual. This discovery shed light on our understanding of how primates interact, and 
more specifically, how they respond to the actions of others. According to Rizzolatti and 
Sinigaglia, the mirror system allows humans and non-human primates to ‘catch in a flash’ the 
intentions behind certain actions when they are performed by others ((2005), 114; emphasis 
in the original). And thus, they go on argue, ‘it is possible to decipher the meaning of the 
“motor events” observed, i.e. to understand them in terms of goal-centred movements’ 
((2005), 125; emphasis in the original). 
In human beings, it has been argued, the mirror-neuron system ‘can accomplish a 
wider range of tasks than that observed in the monkey’ ((2005), 124). The mirror neuron 
system does not just allow for understanding the intentions of certain goal orientated actions, 
but has a role to play in our emotional cognition of others as well. Christian Keysers and 
Valeria Gazzola, for instance, note that the mirror neuron system plays a role in our empathy 
towards other people; when an individual sees someone in pain, their brain responds by 
mirroring the pain and the same areas of the brain are activating as occur when we are in pain 
ourselves ((2009), 17-19) Furthermore, this can be extended to our imitation of the emotional 
states of others, or so Keysers and Gazzola maintain. When experiencing certain emotional 
states in other individuals, such as pleasure, disgust or indifference, for example, the human 
brain mirrors the experience and even produces similar facial expressions to those being 
observed. It has been demonstrated that the replication of facial expressions and emotional 
states in others is accompanied by the activation of the mirror-neuron system.  
The importance of the mirror-neuron system for our current discussion is twofold. 
First, the direct perception of others’ intentions, emotions and mental states allows for a 
complex kind of imitation which far surpasses the minimal requirements of Fridland and 
Moore’s earlier discussion. The ability to ‘mind-read’ as it is often described, then forms the 
basis of many recent discussions of infant development in a wide range of areas—observing 
the actions and intentions of others, particularly care givers, parents and guardians, and then 
replicating these actions, is the primary way that children learn complex languages, social 
skills, and moral values.  
Secondly, the discussion of mirror-neurons also points to another interesting feature 
of the literature on imitation, namely, that imitation is not only an intentional, purposive act 
of replicating observed behaviour, but also, a behaviour that happens at a subconscious level 
by the mirroring of observed behaviour in others. This points us to two different ways of 
thinking about imitation—both at the neural, subconscious level and at the intentional level. 
This mirrors a discussion in the philosophy of empathy, which is a closely connected area of 
philosophy and cognitive psychology. Alvin Goldman has argued that there are two distinct 
kinds of or ‘routes to’ empathy; ‘the mirroring route and the reconstructive route’ ((2011), 
44).13 Empathy via the mirroring route is the kind of experience discussed above, whereby 
                                                          
13 Karsten Steuber (2006) makes a similar distinction between ‘basic’ and ‘re-enactive’ 
empathy ((2006), 131). 
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the mirror-neuron system replicates or copies someone’s emotions or mental states in an 
immediate, automatic and sometimes subconscious, way. Through this experience of mind-
reading, we literally feel someone else’s pain. This is not the only kind of empathy, however. 
Reconstructive empathy, as Goldman describes it, occurs when we try and put ourselves in 
someone else shoes, by reflecting on their position in a process which requires effort, and 
intention ((2011, 36). Although, as Goldman admits, the mirror-neuron system may play a 
part in this second route to empathy, this does not undercut the distinction, he thinks (2011, 
44). The reason for this, Goldman argues, is that the main difference between mirroring and 
reconstructive empathy is that the first is an automatic process, and the second is an effortful 
process requiring imagination and thought ((2011), 44). No doubt the same can be said for 
our understanding of imitation; for whilst the brain subconsciously imitates others in an 
automatic and immediate manner, it is also possible to engage in intentional, effortful 
imitation of another. Both the mirroring and the reconstructive kinds of imitation will be 
important for infant development, and, indeed, I will argue, for our imitation of Christ.  
 
Imitation and Christ: a dilemma  
In the previous discussion, I noted that imitating Christ played an important transformative 
role which distinguished it from other more basic kinds of imitation, such as the imitation of 
Paul, Mary or Bonhoeffer. What should now be clear, is why this is the case, and why it is 
difficult for this kind of replication to play the transformative role it needs to. Imitating Christ 
by simply copying some feature of his behaviour, is more similar to what Fridland and Moore 
describe as a kind of emulation or mimicry. That is, when encouraged to behave as Christ 
behaves, it looks like the best we can hope for is either to copy some behaviour which Christ 
is reported to have performed—such as talking to lepers and outcasts, or sharing bread and 
wine with our friends, or to emulate what we take the intentions of Christ to be, in order to 
achieve our own goals and ends. That is, we might learn from Christ, in being compassionate 
towards the woman at well (John 4), that when faced with social outcasts, we should talk to 
them as equals and be respectful. 
However, imitation, as we have seen, at the very minimal level, is the replication of 
some observed intentional behaviour. At the level required for moral and cognitive 
development, imitation involves a kind of mind-reading in which the agent perceives the 
intentions of another’s behaviour and then replicates this behaviour. Further, we have seen 
that there is an important distinction to be made between low-level mirroring which occurs 
subconsciously and automatically, and high-level, intentional replication of another’s action. 
Both kinds of imitation are vital for the kind of transformative development that we are 
concerned with. However, whilst reading about, and then copying, the behaviour or 
characteristics of some historical figure might have some impact on our own behaviour and 
attitudes, it certainly will not allow for imitation in the full-blown sense. How can we observe 
the behaviour and intentions of a person who existed more than two thousand years ago?  
 The problem, then, is this: if imitating Christ, to use the full technical sense of the 
word ‘imitation’, requires observation of Christ’s intentions and behaviour, then this does not 
appear to be possible. The access we have to Christ is in a historical record of actions Christ 
is reported to have performed. If imitating Christ is not used in the full technical sense, and 
requires only a kind of copying of what we know about Christ, although this is possible, it is 
not clear that this kind of imitation can allow for the deep, personal and cognitive 
transformation that it needs to. So we either have to state that imitating Christ (in the 
transformational sense) is not possible unless we actually meet Christ and observe his actions, 
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or we have to weaken our theological understanding of the role of imitation in our 
transformation and sanctification. It is clear that neither option if preferable.  
 In the remainder of this article, I attempt to resolve this dilemma. In what follows, I 
suggest that imitation of Christ is the full, technical sense, is indeed possible. In particular, if 
the recent work analysing the nature of Christian religious experience by Eleonore Stump 
(2012) and Adam Green (2009, with Quan (2012)) is correct, then we have a model which 
can explain how imitating Christ is possible through an experience of his presence.  
 
Joint-attention and imitation 
The underlying assumption which motivated the dilemma facing our understanding of the 
imitation of Christ was that Christ is a historical person who we can read about, and learn 
about, but not a living person who we can engage with and experience. It is clear, though, 
that this assumption is neither in keeping with Christian tradition and theology, nor Christian 
practice and belief. If this is the case, and Christ is a living person who we can engage with 
and experience, then perhaps, it might be argued, the technical notion of imitation can be 
applied to our imitation of Christ.  
First, we should note that Christian theology typically puts prominence on the fact 
that relationship with Christ is not relationship with a historical figure, but with a living 
person; as John the Evangelist states, ‘our fellowship is with the Father and with his Son 
Jesus Christ.’ (1 John 1:3), or, according to Christ himself: ‘I am with you always, to the 
close of the age’ (Matthew 28:20). As prophesied in Isaiah (7:14) and then fulfilled at his 
birth (Matthew 1:23), Christ is called ‘Immanuel’ which translates as ‘God with us’. The 
Incarnation brings with it a new intimacy with God which ‘removes the veil’ of separation 
between humanity and God (2 Corinthians 3:14). The withness of Christ does not refer 
merely to some historical event, but Christ as Immanuel has present significance for the 
contemporary Christian believer. 
Secondly, this emphasis on Christ as a living person is reflected in the discussion of 
spiritual practice. Anthony Bloom, for instance writes that ‘prayer is an encounter and a 
relationship’ (1970, 2). The importance of Christ as a living person is also reflected in reports 
of religious experience. Consider an example from Bloom’s conversion account, for example: 
 
While I was reading the beginning of St Mark's Gospel, before I reached the third 
chapter, I suddenly became aware that on the other side of the desk there was a 
presence. And the certainty was so strong that it was Christ standing there that it has 
never left me. This was the real turning point. Because Christ was alive and I had 
been in his presence I could say with certainty that what the Gospel said about the 
crucifixion of the prophet of Galilee was true. (1970, xii)  
 
Although Bloom’s report, and others like it, describe experiences of the person of Christ, it is 
not obvious yet how this solves the dilemma we considered. In order to see how this is 
possible, we need first to understand better the nature of religious experience and experiences 
of Christ’s presence with and to his followers.  
 According to Adam Green, religious experiences can be understood as instances of 
joint-attention (or shared-attention) with Christ.14 Importantly for us, Green’s model of 
religious experience also happens to be the way that psychologists account for the kind of 
                                                          
14 Note that Green talks about shared-attention with God more broadly rather than only 
shared-attention with Christ. 
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engagement individuals need to have with one another in order to mind-read, and thus, to 
imitate.15 To describe it simply, joint-attention is a form of social engagement in which we 
are aware that another person is ‘in engagement with an object or potential object as a process 
over time’ (Reddy (2011), 137). As Axel Seemen notes in his volume on joint-attention, 
although ‘the discussion of joint attention is anything but unified’ ((2011), 1), there is a 
common position which all discussions of joint-attention share. Namely ‘that an adequate 
understanding of the life of the mind has to pay particular attention to its social dimension’ 
((2011), 2), and move from a ‘solipsistic conception of mind…toward a view of mental 
phenomena as inherently social’ ((2011), 2). Crucially for my argument, then, joint-attention 
experiences are an important part of social engagement in infant development and the process 
of imitation.  
  An infant’s awareness and engagement with other persons develops over time, and 
begins with a kind of dyadic-joint-attention, that is, attention which requires only awareness 
of another person through a kind of mutual gazing. This basic kind of attention sharing is 
possible very early on in infants (from zero to two months, according to Vasudevi Reddy 
((2011), 145)). The ability to jointly-attend then develops into a kind of triadic joint-attention, 
at around four to five months, that is, joint-attention in which an infant gains the ability to 
focus on some independent object whilst still remaining aware of the other person (Reddy 
(2005), 85-7). To clarify with an example: when a child looks her mother in the eye, then 
points towards an object, and then looks back to the eyes of the mother, if the mother follows 
the direction of her child’s gaze, then they had a dyadic joint-attention to begin with, 
followed by a triadic joint-attention focusing on the object.16 This ability to follow the gaze of 
others and mutually focus on objects in a kind of triadic attention develops later, at around 
nine to fourteen months, into ability of engaging in the process of ‘imitating actions on 
objects’ ((2011), 145).  
As developmental psychopathologist R. Peter Hobson, notes, joint-attention 
experiences are essential to the development of an infant’s ability for intersubjective 
engagement and mind-reading ((2004), 85-109). Hobson cites an experiment conducted in 
which infants were shown a monitor with a real time feed of their mother and others with a 
delayed feed of their mother. The infants who engaged with the real time feed responded as if 
the mother were present in the room, whereas the infants responding to the delayed feed 
showed signs of distress and looked away ((2004) 38-9). What Hobson takes from this study 
is that there is a difference between merely responding to certain emotions as they are 
expressed facially and responding to emotions when we engage in joint-attention with the 
other person. Or in other words, dyadic and triadic joint-attention experiences are vital to our 
intersubjective experiences of others and are required for imitation.  
Drawing from this discussion of joint-attention in the psychological literature, Green 
then argues that religious experiences are best understood as instances of joint-attention with 
God, rather than, say, experiences in which the believer perceives God in some way.17 Often, 
when we come to describe religious experiences, Green notes, we overlook the fact that God 
is a person. If God is an inherently personal being who is aware of all human beings and 
desires to be in communion with them, he claims, we should expect that his interactions with 
                                                          
15 The discussion of joint-attention in the psychological literature is as vast as that on 
imitation, and I will not have space for a detailed discussion. For an excellent volume which 
discusses the importance of joint-attention, see, Axel Seeman’s (ed.) Joint Attention.  
16 This is similar to an example which Green considers ((2009), 460). 
17 Such as Alston’s (1993) account in Perceiving God, for example. 
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us would be in some way personal rather than merely perceptual ((2009), 461-2). Green 
proposes a joint-attention model of mystical experience as follows: 
 
One is engaged in dyadic shared attention with God iff one is aware of God as 
exhibiting some mental state which is directed towards oneself and the mental state 
which God exhibits involves an awareness of the co-operative nature of the present 
attention. This co-operation will be invested with an interactive pattern of affect since 
to experience God is to experience both the source of all goodness and to experience 
someone who wants to have them most intimate of relationships with one. ((2009), 
462) 
 
According to Green, this model of religious experience makes sense both of the personal 
nature of God and of the reports of experiences we find in testimony such as Bloom’s. The 
joint-attention model offers a way of understanding religious experience which allows for a 
description of how actions are perceived as well as emotions and intentions. It also means 
that God can manipulate the media by which we perceive the world (light, sound etc.) to 
reveal his emotions and actions towards us. According to Green’s model, the individual who 
experiences God through joint-attention does not have to perform an inference to establish 
that she is experiencing God, but there is a kind of intersubjective relation that occurs 
between God and her. The individual experiences something of God’s emotions or intentions 
whether that be God’s loving, or God’s forgiving or God’s imparting mercy. To use an 
example, when reading Scripture we may become aware that God is present with us (dyadic 
joint-attention) and then, after reading some words in which God speaks, experience him 
speak directly to us and have an experience in which he is drawing attention to the pride in 
our heart (triadic joint-attention), for instance.18  
We are now in a position to consider how experience of Christ relates to imitating 
Christ. The kind of experience which will be relevant for our imitation of Christ will be 
sharing attention with Christ. Many religious experiences are already understood as 
experiences of Christ, rather than just as experiences of God. Sharing attention with Christ, I 
think, is a particular subset of sharing attention with God. If Green’s analysis is correct, then 
experience of Christ is an example of joint-attention in which Christ’s emotions and 
intentions are revealed to us in an immediate way. This can give us an important basis for 
understanding how imitating Christ is possible in the full technical sense we previously 
discussed. However, before spelling this out in more detail, it is important to consider the fact 
that, according to the Christian tradition, Christ is not only present to us and with us, but the 
Holy Spirit is also present in us.  
 
Imitation and indwelling 
As I described it earlier, Paul’s description of imitation and the restoration of the imago dei 
from 2 Corinthians 3, is a process in which the believer has direct access to God through 
Christ, made possible by the Holy Spirit. An important aspect of imitation which I have yet to 
consider, then, is the role of the Holy Spirit. According to Christian doctrine, one of the ways 
Christ is present to us in our ordinary lives, is through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. How 
should we best understand this doctrine? A helpful way of thinking about what it means to be 
                                                          
18 Green and Quan, ‘More than Shared Propositions: Shared Attention and the Religious 
Text’ Green and Quan apply the joint-attention model to our understanding of God’s living 
presence through Scripture. 
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present in something can be found in another discussion of Christian doctrine—the presence 
of Christ in the Eucharistic elements. When we say that Christ is present in the Eucharistic 
elements, following Ross Inman’s (forthcoming) account of presence, we could understand 
this in terms of fundamental location, that is, we could say that Christ’s body is located in a 
particular space at a particular time. Or, alternatively, we could understand this as a kind of 
derivative presence, in which case Christ’s body is present in virtue of standing in relation to 
a person who is present in a particular space at a particular time (Inman (forthcoming), 3). 
That is, the Eucharist elements provide an occasion for and mode of experiencing Christ’s 
presence. 19 Similarly, then, when we say that the indwelling of the Holy Spirit makes it 
possible to experience Christ’s presence, we could understand this as a claim about Christ’s 
derivative location in a person. Described as such, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit acts as an 
occasion for and mode of experiencing Christ’s presence. A helpful way of describing the 
Holy Spirit’s indwelling as an instance of derivative presence can be seen by looking at 
Stump’s discussion of this doctrine.  
As Stump describes it, when an individual Paula, comes to faith, ‘the indwelling of 
the Holy Spirit puts the mind of God within Paula’s psyche, in some sense’ ((2012), 80). As 
Stump notes, the Holy Spirit’s indwelling cannot be understood merely as God having 
maximal knowledge about Paula, but ‘it is also possible for God to communicate in a direct 
and unmediated way with the mind of that person’ ((2012), 80). Stump then goes on to 
propose a model of indwelling which she draws from the psychological literature on joint-
attention, mindreading and mirror neurons. As Stump describes it, a mutually loving union 
between two persons is one in which there is ‘a particularly intimate kind of mind-reading 
accompanied by shared attention between persons‘((2012), 80).  
However, even this intimate kind of relation between two persons in love will be not 
sufficient to explain the intimacy of the Holy Spirit’s indwelling, Stump argues. Moving 
beyond an account of mindreading, Stump then discusses the kind of mind-sharing that would 
be needed for indwelling to be possible. She notes that in cases of neural dysfunction or 
injury, ‘a patient can suffer the delusion that some part of his body is not his own’ ((2012), 
83). Building on this possibility, of experiencing other’s mental states as one’s own, Stump 
argues that  
 
[b]ecause of the systems of the human brain for recognizing some mental states as 
one’s own, it is also possible for a person Jerome to have a sense of the mind 
operative in him as not his own but someone else’s. In a case of this sort, the 
intersubjectivity of mental states enabled by the mirror neuron system and evident in 
mind-reading transforms from a mere psychological sharing to something that is 
ontological. What is in Jerome’s mind is not just another person’s thought or affect, 
but in fact that other person’s mind. “Indwelling” is not a bad word for this kind of 
relationship between minds. ((2012), 83) 
 
Although at face value, Stump’s proposal sounds a little far-fetched, and is certainly beyond 
the scope of current psychological study of intersubjective relations, it is a helpful way of 
making sense of how a person could indwell in another. Stump’s proposal also makes good 
                                                          
19 Unfortunately, there is not space here for a detailed development of this account of the 
Eucharist. However, it has potential to solve many of the problems which existing accounts 
of Christ’s presence in the Eucharist raise. For more details on this interpretation of the 
Eucharist, see (Cockayne et al., Ms.)  
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sense of the theology of indwelling as it describes God as actually present in a human being, 
rather than merely present with or present to. It also gives a helpful way thinking about the 
description of derivative presence I described earlier. And although Stump doesn’t focus 
exclusively on Christ’s presence made possible through the indwelling of the Spirit, as Christ 
tells us in the Gospel according to John, one of the roles of the Holy Spirit is to reveal Christ 
to the individual (John 16:14-16). Whilst there is not space to fill this out in detail here, if our 
imitation of Christ requires not only action replication, but also some understanding of 
intention and a kind of mind-to-mind connection, then the permanent indwelling of the Holy 
Spirit, understood as an occasion for and mode of experiencing Christ’s presence will provide 
a helpful way of understanding how imitation is possible.  
 
Imitating Christ: a joint-attention account 
If Green’s and Stump’s accounts of presence and experience as instances of joint-attention 
and mind-to-mind engagement with God are correct, then it appears that there is a way of 
resolving the prior dilemma. That is, if we can engage with Christ as a person and share-
attention with him in both a dyadic and triadic way, then plausibly, we can also imitate Christ 
in a way that is spiritually developmental and radically transformational. 
 In contrast to the WWJD model, then, imitation does not begin with an attempt to 
work out what Christ has done and might do, but it should begin with an experience of 
Christ’s presence. As we have seen with Goldman’s distinction between higher-level and 
lower-level empathy, there are different kinds of imitation—imitation occurs a subconscious 
level when we share attention with a person, but we must also work at the process of 
imitation ourselves. Imitation, as a form of sanctification, is a co-operative and purposive 
venture, not a passive change. And so, imitation, whilst beginning with an experience of 
Christ’s presence, will go on to involve intentional and disciplined action on behalf of the 
imitator, but this will only be made possible, I maintain, if imitation begins with a direct 
experience of Christ, made possible the by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.  
Thus, there is no dilemma for our understanding of imitation, since imitation in the 
full transformative sense is only possible through joint-attention and personal engagement, 
and since such an experience is possible of Christ, then we can affirm both the theological 
importance of radical transformation, as well as defending an account of imitation which is 
both practical and plausible.  
It may be the case, however, that this account is too restrictive in allowing imitation 
only to those who have vivid experiences of Christ. This objection should not be too 
troubling if we recall our earlier discussion. Imitation is a process which will not be complete 
in this life. Recall Paul’s claim that: ‘we all, with unveiled face, beholding the glory of the 
Lord, are being changed into his likeness from one degree of glory to another’ (2 Corinthians 
3:18). Imitation is about being changed into his likeness; the verb ‘being’ here implies that 
coming into Christ’s likeness is not an immediate thing. Indeed, it is not a change which can 
be fully achieved in this life, as he maintains later, ‘now we see in a mirror dimly, but then 
face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall understand fully, even as I have been fully 
understood.’ (1 Corinthians 13:12). And so imitation of Christ is something we aim to 
cultivate but never expect to complete.  
Just as an infant’s development requires stages of personal presence, according to 
Reedy ((2011, 145), we should also expect the experience of Christ’s presence comes in 
stages. From a minimal kind of presence, such as the one described by Tracey Emin in her 
Liverpool Cathedral instillation, ‘I felt you, and knew that you loved me’, to the vivid 
experiences of William James, who claims that ‘I could not any more have doubted that He 
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was there than that I was. Indeed, I felt myself to be, if possible, the less real of the two’ 
(1994, 66-67). If our prior account of sanctification was correct, then this is to be expected; 
sanctification is a cooperative and ongoing process which results in becoming more like 
Christ through the development of our spiritual attention-sharing abilities. As Brother 
Lawrence describes in The Practice of the Presence of God, the experience of God’s presence 
requires practice and discipline. The ‘habitual sense of God’s presence’ (2009, 17; emphasis 
in the original) Brother Lawrence reportedly experienced was not an immediate experience, 
but one which required years of worship and confession. Indeed, the other kinds of behaviour 
replication may be useful here—in emulating or mimicking Christ’s actions as they are 
recorded in Scripture, we may open ourselves up to the possibility of genuine imitation and 
attempt to cultivate an awareness of the presence of Christ.  
This response helps to draw out what is crucial to our understanding of imitating 
Christ; the aim of the Christian spiritual life should be a kind of cultivation of the awareness 
of Christ’s presence. Seeking after the presence of Christ is crucial to understanding how the 
individual imitates Him—if we want to imitate Christ we must aim to spend time with Christ 
and develop an awareness of his presence. This brings a new significance to the spiritual 
practises which enable us to experience Christ’s presence and help us to become more aware 
of this through our practice. That may be by experiencing Christ through Scripture, which, in 
the Christian tradition is of vital importance for hearing God’s words and experiencing his 
presence today. It may be through mystical experiences such as the ones described above, or 
through simple meditation and prayer. Interestingly, this also gives an added dimension to the 
discussion of what it means to experience Christ in the Eucharist.20 If the model of imitation I 
propose in this paper is correct, then there are countless applications of this to our 
understanding of the Christian spiritual life.  
 
Conclusion  
The imitation of Christ has an important role to play in our understanding of the Christian 
spiritual life and the restoration of the imago dei through the process of justification, 
sanctification of deification. What I have attempted to offer, in appealing to the psychology 
of imitation, is an account of just what this imitation consists of. The psychology of imitation 
sheds light on our imitation of Christ and the importance of cultivating an awareness of the 
presence of Christ in the Christian spiritual life. If imitating Christ begins by experiencing the 
presence of Christ along with his actions, emotions and intentions, then this model gives us 
an insight into some existing problems in the philosophy of spirituality and has potential to be 
applied, I think, to a wide range of topics in this area.21  
 
  
                                                          
20 Although there is a small amount of work done on Eucharist as imitation (see Laurence, 
‘The Eucharist as Imitation of Christ’), there is considerable potential here, I think, for a 
philosophical analysis of the Eucharist as joint-attention with, and, imitation of, Christ.  
21I would like to thank David Efird for his detailed feedback and advice on the multiple drafts 
of this article which have existed. I would also like to thank David Worsley, Chris Jay, Adam 
Green, as well as the members of the St. Benedict Society for Philosophical Theology and 
Philosophy of Religion at the University of York for their helpful feedback on earlier drafts 
of this article. 
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